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There are major differences 
between macroeconomic 
policy and central banking 
in China and in the U.S.
The speciﬁ  c occasion for our visit to 
China in March 2007 was a series of 
lectures on monetary policy that Michael 
delivered to three leading Chinese uni-
versities: Tsinghua University, Fudan 
University, and the Central Party School 
of the Communist Party. The broader pur-
pose of the trip was to enhance mutual 
understanding between U.S. and Chinese 
ofﬁ  cials concerning economic and ﬁ  nan-
cial conditions in both countries.1 
As part of the visit, we met with ofﬁ  cials 
of government agencies, including the 
People’s Bank of China (the central 
bank), the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, and the Shanghai Metro-
politan Government Financial Services 
Ofﬁ  ce. We also met with senior represen-
tatives of leading manufacturing com-
panies (BorgWarner, Caterpillar, and 
General Motors) and ﬁ  nancial services 
companies (Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, 
JPMorgan Chase, Northern Trust, and 
Tianan Insurance). Finally, we visited 
two key ﬁ  nancial markets: the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange and the Shanghai 
Futures Exchange.
China has made huge progress in achiev-
ing high rates of economic growth, lifting 
hundreds of millions of people out of pov-
erty, developing its manufacturing sector, 
producing impressive rates of savings and 
investment, and building export growth. 
It has been an amazing success story, 
and the signs of this success were visible 
throughout our visit.
Our trip highlighted some major differ-
ences between macroeconomic policy and 
central banking in China and in the U.S. 
We were also struck by some of the chal-
lenges China faces as it continues to 
modernize its economy and improve its 
business processes and the functioning 
of its ﬁ  nancial markets in the context of 
its existing political system. These chal-
lenges include corporate governance, 
market infrastructure, and economic 
efﬁ  ciency. Finally, we address some issues 
that may affect China’s future economic 
development, including concerns about 
unmet needs of certain population seg-
ments and the environment.
Macroeconomic policy and central 
banking
Economic growth in China has been very 
different from that in the U.S. Since eco-
nomic reform began in 1978, China has 
averaged gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth of almost 10% per year—the 
fastest in the world over this period. Not 
only is China’s growth much faster than 
that of the U.S., but it has also been large-
ly driven by investment. Investment rep-
resents approximately 40% of GDP in 
China, compared with about 20% in the 
U.S. The downside of this impressive 
investment performance is that the China has a complex political economy that represents a hybrid 
of private ownership and state control.
consumption sector in China is under-
developed, with signiﬁ  cant unmet needs. 
In per capita terms, China is still a lower-
middle-income country, with 130 million 
Chinese falling below international pov-
erty lines.2 Moving toward a growth path 
that relies more on domestic consump-
tion demand is part of China’s current 
ﬁ  ve-year plan. China also wants to pro-
mote faster development of the service 
sector, including the small- and medium-
sized enterprises that are so important to 
the U.S. economy. To increase consump-
tion of goods, such as televisions, refrig-
erators, and washing machines, China 
has completed rural water and electri-
ﬁ  cation projects. Another positive sign 
is that consumer loans are increasing.
China’s central bank also functions quite 
differently compared with the U.S. model. 
Unlike our Federal Reserve System, the 
People’s Bank of China is not politically 
independent. It reports directly to the 
State Council, which serves as China’s 
cabinet as well as its highest executive 
body. Monetary policy in China aims at 
limiting the appreciation of mainland 
China’s ofﬁ  cial currency, the renminbi 
(RMB),3 while keeping economic growth 
at a sustainable pace and inﬂ  ation under 
control and preserving a fragile banking 
system. In contrast, the Federal Reserve’s 
monetary policy has a dual objective of 
maximum employment and price stability.
There is large and ongoing demand for 
RMB because China runs a high current 
account surplus—nearly $330 billion 
expected for 2007.4 To maintain RMB at 
the desired level, the Chinese central 
bank issues RMB to meet this demand, 
thereby increasing the money circulat-
ing in China. To keep economic growth 
and inﬂ  ation under control, the central 
bank sterilizes its foreign exchange mar-
ket interventions; i.e., it buys back some 
of the RMB that it issued to buy dollars. 
In particular, it does so by selling low-
yield government securities to state-
owned banks. So far, banks have been 
able to absorb those low-yield bonds in 
part because the interest rates paid on 
bank deposits are also maintained at 
artiﬁ  cially low rates. Nonetheless, the 
increases in foreign reserves are not 
fully neutralized. Over the last ﬁ  ve years, 
Chinese M2 (the broad money supply, 
which includes cash and bank deposits) 
has been growing above 15% per annum, 
while real economic growth has averaged 
about 10.5%.
Against the background of China’s fast-
growing economy, it is difﬁ  cult for the 
central bank to evaluate the economy’s 
maximum potential pace of noninﬂ  ation-
ary growth—in other words, a sustain-
able level that would be associated with 
a strong, but not overheating, economy. 
Unlike more-developed market econo-
mies, China is reluctant to raise domestic 
interest rates to slow its domestic growth. 
To do so might mean attracting more 
capital inﬂ  ows, which would, in turn, re-
quire further money issuance to stabi-
lize the exchange rate. This is why the 
Chinese central bank instead raises lev-
els of bank reserve requirements (the 
amount of money a bank is required to 
keep on its account at the central bank) 
on an ongoing basis to slow the expan-
sion of money and credit.
Over the long run, such practices as 
setting higher reserve requirements 
and asking banks to buy low-yield bonds 
could have a distorting effect on banks’ 
balance sheets and the overall economy. 
Also, under this system, China must im-
pose capital controls (restrict the ﬂ  ows 
of capital transactions between residents 
and nonresidents) to avoid a massive in-
ﬂ  ow of speculative portfolio investment 
that would cause the currency to appre-
ciate and put pressure on its export sec-
tors. These capital controls also prevent 
a run on domestic banks that are not offer-
ing yields that would match those offered 
by international ﬁ  nancial markets. 
A hybrid political economy
China has a complex political economy 
that represents a hybrid of private owner-
ship and state control. In contrast to a 
classical “socialist” economy, private own-
ership of the means of production is domi-
nant in China and may represent as much 
as two-thirds of the economy. China’s econ-
omy (including its so-called state-owned 
enterprises) represents a continuum of 
various mixes of public and private owner-
ship. In addition to the complex and ever-
shifting boundary between the public and 
private sectors, the relative power of the 
central government versus the provincial 
governments shifts over time as well. 
Corporate governance
Observers accustomed to a U.S. or Western 
European context note a number of 
weaknesses in corporate governance at 
Chinese ﬁ  rms. Chinese ofﬁ  cials them-
selves have identiﬁ  ed embezzlement by 
majority shareholders and the neglect 
of duties by directors as fundamental 
issues. In addition, many senior execu-
tives of Chinese companies come from 
government, and many reportedly re-
tain a political mind-set. As we observed 
on one occasion, a phone call from the 
Communist Party can put all “business 
as usual” on hold. We were also told the 
party retains considerable control over 
human resource decisions at many ﬁ  rms, 
such as hiring and compensation. Finally, 
the Chinese legal system lacks the range 
of civil and criminal penalties for corpo-
rate malfeasance that we have in the U.S. 
A key challenge is the continuing role 
of state-owned enterprises. The stake that 
the government holds in these ﬁ  rms has 
been reduced sharply. In addition, gov-
ernment is making a transition from com-
plete control to providing direction. 
However, many companies are hybrids—
publicly traded on the stock exchange 
but still majority-owned by the govern-
ment. It is very difﬁ  cult to implement 
Western-style corporate governance in 
such a context. For example, what exactly 
does “shareholders’ rights” mean when 
the largest shareholder is the government, 
with at least a 51% stake? 
According to one expert we spoke with, 
China’s state-owned enterprises are hin-
dered by the structural problems that 
characterize its bureaucracy in general.5 
In particular, senior ofﬁ  cials are often 
required to do jobs for which they are 
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was directed by the central government 
to privatize several hundred state-owned 
ﬁ  rms within two years, even though he 
had never privatized a business before 
and had very little idea how to proceed. 
In addition, many senior government 
ofﬁ  cials are moved from one assignment 
to another too quickly, which limits 
their effectiveness. 
Chinese ofﬁ  cials are taking steps to im-
prove corporate governance. For ex-
ample, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission has hosted meetings to pro-
mote better governance practices. In 
addition, the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
has implemented strong governance 
rules for listed companies. These include 
requirements that one-third of corpo-
rate directors be independent and that 
the role of chairman be separated from 
that of chief executive ofﬁ  cer.
It should be noted that these same cor-
porate governance issues exist in a num-
ber of other countries where partially 
state-owned enterprises are publicly 
traded. However, they are especially acute 
in China, which is still in a transition 
toward a market economy.
Market infrastructure
As in other developing countries, China 
faces several challenges in creating a 
strong ﬁ  nancial market infrastructure. 
It was only very recently that bankruptcy 
laws covering private ﬁ  rms went into ef-
fect. In addition, although stock markets 
were reopened in the early 1990s, China’s 
stock market capitalization as a share of 
GDP is very small compared with that 
of other developing countries. 
Financial markets are still in the early 
stages of development. China’s corporate 
bond market is small relative to GDP and 
is dominated by large state-owned enter-
prises. In addition, even proﬁ  table small- 
and medium-sized businesses ﬁ  nd it hard 
to borrow from Chinese banks.6 China’s 
government bond market offers a narrow 
range of products, with a very limited 
secondary market. Finally, ﬁ  nancial in-
novations, such as trade in derivatives, 
are being introduced only slowly.
Efﬁ  ciency
A number of barriers stand in the way 
of greater efﬁ  ciency in the Chinese 
economy. One of these barriers is a heavy 
emphasis on high employment. This 
leads to jobs being deﬁ  ned very narrowly 
and other inefﬁ  ciencies, such as a govern-
ment policy of splitting road construction 
contracts into two-mile increments to 
support small construction companies.
Another barrier is the reliance on older 
accounting systems that focus on ﬂ  ows of 
funds, not earnings. Similarly, lending to 
a state-owned enterprise does not require 
analyzing whether the company will be 
able to repay the loan in the future. In 
the past, managers have been compen-
sated for completing projects and for high 
employment, but not for proﬁ  tability.
Looking toward the future
Looking ahead, the Chinese economy 
will face challenges in correcting imbal-
ances stemming from its current pattern 
of economic growth. We have already 
mentioned the challenge to balance con-
sumption and investment. Unmet needs 
and the societal costs of growth, such as 
health and environmental concerns, will 
also need to be addressed to sustain 
China’s high rate of economic growth.
So far, China’s economic growth has been 
very uneven across regions and provinces. 
Drastic differences in the rate of devel-
opment remain between urban and ru-
ral areas. Average disposable per capita 
income in rural areas is less than one-
third of that in urban areas. Disparities 
are even worse in the poorest rural areas. 
There is also a geographical dimension 
to these gaps—most investment is on the 
east coast. Formerly, people were not 
allowed to move from one region to an-
other to get better jobs, which enhanced 
the power of the regional governments. 
Social welfare programs—pensions, 
health care, and education—are poten-
tial sources of unrest. Pensions cover only 
city workers, who make up approximately 
28% of the population. Chinese ofﬁ  cials 
acknowledge that pension funds are ba-
sically insolvent. Affordability of health 
care is also an issue. There is a huge gap 
between health care in the cities and in 
the rural areas, where the former system 
of free clinics has disintegrated. The vast 
majority of the rural population is now 
uninsured, but most urban residents have 
some kind of health coverage, which is 
supplied by their employers. Finally, there 
are gaps in education. While literacy is 
high overall, many Chinese do not have 
access to the high-quality education they 
need to thrive in today’s global economy.
China’s rapid industrialization and over-
all rate of economic growth have had a 
severe impact on the environment. Its 
pattern of growth has been highly energy-
intensive, with a heavy reliance on coal. 
Coal provides about 70% of China’s ener-
gy needs, and in 2006 the country con-
sumed more coal than the U.S., Japan, 
and the UK combined.7 In addition, 
rapid industrialization has led to water 
shortages and urban congestion. China’s 
leaders plan to relocate 400 million peo-
ple to newly developed urban centers 
between 2000 and 2030. All these envi-
ronmental impacts have led observers to 
question whether China’s high rates of 
economic growth are sustainable. On the 
positive side, the government is increas-
ingly open to acknowledging environ-
mental problems and developing 
interim solutions. 
At the Communist Party’s recent twice-
a-decade National Congress, held in 
October 2007, China’s leadership out-
lined goals for the next few years that 
addressed some of the imbalances and 
concerns we have just mentioned. 1 Many of our conclusions derive from a mix-
ture of personal observations and interviews 
with experts who were speaking “off the 
record,” so speciﬁ  c sources cannot be pro-
vided in many instances. However, where 
possible, we have provided publicly avail-
able sources for our most signiﬁ  cant points. 
We would like to thank Steven VanBever 
and Benoît Mojon, both of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago, for assistance 
with this article.
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3  The renminbi is the name of the currency, 
while the yuan is one unit of the currency. 
4 A country has a current account surplus 
when its exports of goods and services ex-
ceed its imports.  
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gap,” Foreign Affairs, November/December, 
pp. 133–140.
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backward?,” Foreign Affairs, September/
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8 Andrew Batson and Jason Leow, 2007, 
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9 Andrew Batson and Jason Leow, 2007, “Hu’s 
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Chinese leader Hu Jintao indicated that 
growth will continue to be the top pri-
ority, with the government’s goal being 
to double per capita GDP by 2020 and 
“basically eliminate” absolute poverty. 
However, the government will also try 
to reduce the impact of growth on re-
source consumption and on the envi-
ronment. Hu proposed a restructuring 
of the economy to emphasize technol-
ogy rather than heavy industry, services 
rather than manufacturing, and con-
sumer spending rather than exports. 
Hu also said the government will raise 
minimum wages, expand health care 
and the social safety net, and stimulate 
job creation in the private sector.8
In addition, a new group of top ofﬁ  cials, 
whose experience in local government 
could help Beijing strengthen its author-
ity over local interests, emerged at the 
National Congress. Up to now, local 
governments have thwarted many of 
the central government’s initiatives re-
lated to narrowing income gaps, im-
proving environmental protections, and 
creating a stronger social safety net.9
After the National Congress, the govern-
ment announced new antipollution reg-
ulations for the export industry. Export 
manufacturers that violate China’s pol-
lution laws would be forced to close for 
one to three years. In the past, such com-
panies have only received small ﬁ  nes. A 
signiﬁ  cant portion of China’s air pollu-
tion is due to the production of goods 
for export.10
Despite such reform efforts, one analyst 
has expressed skepticism about the prom-
ises made at the National Congress about 
broadening prosperity, expanding the so-
cial safety net, and increasing education 
subsidies. He noted that, despite recent 
increases in social welfare spending, 
made possible by surging government 
revenues, peasants and workers contin-
ue to be excluded from positions of 
power in the Communist Party.11
Conclusion
China continues to engineer high rates 
of economic growth, using an economic 
system that has never been seen before 
in history. However, the country faces 
enormous challenges because of its sheer 
size, its rapid rate of social and economic 
change, the conﬂ  icts between its tradi-
tional political and cultural institutions 
and the dynamism of the market, and 
the massive unmet needs of its popula-
tion and the environment. China’s lead-
ership has been focusing intently on 
these challenges and is studying how 
other countries are addressing similar 
issues. Clearly, the solutions must ﬁ  t 
the unique circumstances in China. 
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